

Message Text

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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 1 OF 3 BUCHAREST 4075

EXDIS

C O R R E C T E D C O P Y (TEXT)

NOFORN

EO 11652: XGDS-1
TAGS: RO US CH TW KN KS VM CB LA PG UR PEPR
SUBJECT: SEAUSESCU'S FAR EAST TRIP: REPORT TO PRESIDENT
CARTER THROUGH FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI
REF: (A) MOSCOW 13433, (B) BUCHAREST 4028 (C) STATE 149001

1. SUMMARY. ON BEHALF OF PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU, FONMIN ANDREI GAVE ME BRIEFING ON FAR EAST TRIP FOR PRESIDENT CARTER JUNE 12. BRIEFING APPEARS TO ME TO BE EXCEPTIONALLY RICH AND DETAILED, AND HE ASKED THAT IT BE MADE AVAILABLE ONLY TO HIGH LEVEL OF US GOVERNMENT. IN GENERAL, ACCOUNT APPEARS TO CONFIRM PREVIOUS SUGGESTIONS THAT VISITS TO PEKING, PYONGYANG AND PHNOM PENH WERE OUTSTANDINGLY SUCCESSFUL, THOSE TO HANOI AND VIENTIANE MUCH LESS SO. MATERIAL ON CHINESE APPROACH TO BORDER DISPUTE WITH SOVIETS (PARA 6), NORTH KOREAN APPROACH TO TRILATERAL TALKS (PARA 13) AND VIETNAMESE APPROACH TO RELATIONS WITH US (PARA 15) MAY BE ESPECIALLY USEFUL. KOREANS SAID THAT DEGREE RPT DEGREE OF DEMOCRATIZATION IN SOUTH, INVOLVING SUCH STEPS AS FREEING OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND LEGALIZATION OF PARTIES, SHOULD CREATE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR TRILATERAL TALKS. VIETNAMESE SAID THEY
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ARE LOOKING FOR PACKAGE DEAL INVOLVING (1) REESTABLISHMENT (SIC) OF RELATIONS WITH US, (2) ACCOUNTING FOR US WAR DEAD AND MIAS, AND (3) US CONTRIBUTION TO REBUILDING IN FORM ACCEPTABLE TO US. ANDREI INFORMED ME THAT HUA KUO-FENG WOULD VISIT ROMANIA IN MID-AUGUST. END SUMMARY.

2. FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI ASKED ME TO CALL ON HIM JUNE 12 AT THE MINISTRY, AND HE PRESENTED BRIEFING ON CEAUSESCU'S FAR EAST TRIP. IN SPIRIT OF RELATIONS BETWEEN TWO COUNTRIES, HE BEGAN, AS AGREED BY TWO PRESIDENTS IN WASHINGTON, HE HAD BEEN ASKED BY HIS PRESIDENT TO INFORM PRESIDENT CARTER THROUGH ME ABOUT ASIA TRIP. HE WOULD NOT DISCUSS ITS IMPORTANCE, WHICH WAS SUBJECT OF POLITICAL EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE DECISION, BUT ONLY FACTS AND JUDGMENTS.

3. CHINA. RECEPTION HAD BEEN GOOD. PRESIDENT CEAUSESCU HAD MET WITH ALMOST WHOLE LEADERSHIP OF CCP, AND WAS WELL RECEIVED IN PROVINCES TOO. HE HAD HAD SEVERAL DISCUSSIONS WITH HUA KUO-FENG, LI HSIEN-NIEN AND OTHER LEADERS, AND HAD ALSO MET WITH TENG HSIAO-PING.

4. CHINA'S DOMESTIC SITUATION. ROMANIAN CONCLUSION IS THAT CCP IS PUTTING GREAT EMPHASIS ON ORDER, DISCIPLINE AND DEVELOPMENT, AND ON MODERNIZATION "IN THE FOUR FIELDS." TWO SIDES DISCUSSED CHANGES WHICH HAD TAKEN PLACE SINCE 1976, YEAR OF DEATHS OF MAO, CHOU EN-LAI AND CHU TEH, OF FLOODS, DROUGHT AND EARTHQUAKE WHICH HIT 7.8 ON RICHTER SCALE. BUT CHINESE HAD TOLD ROMANIANS THAT WORST CALAMITY HAD BEEN GROUP OF 4, AND IT HAD CONSEQUENCES ALL OVER CHINA. CCP CONTINUES TO CRITICIZE IDEOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL POSITIONS OF GROUP OF 4; CAMPAIGN IS INTENDED SPECIFICALLY TO ASSURE GREATER CONFIDENTIAL

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UNITY BETWEEN PARTY AND PEOPLE, AND PARTY IS CLEARLY DIRECTING PROCESS.

5. CHINESE ECONOMIC PLANS. CHINESE HAVE ESTABLISHED DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM AND PLAN FOR PERIOD UNTIL 1985. IN 1985 THEY PLAN TO PRODUCE 400 MILLION TONS OF GRAIN AND 60 MILLION TONS OF STEEL, AND TO ACHIEVE ANNUAL GROWTH RATES OF 11 PERCENT FOR INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND 4.5 PERCENT FOR AGRICULTURE. BY YEAR 2000 THEY WISH TO BE FULLY MODERNIZED, IN THE ECONOMIC FIELD, IN SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY, AND IN DEENSE. IT IS CLEAR IN THIS REGARD, SAID ANDREI, THAT CHINA WILL OPEN ITSELF LARGELY TO EXPANDED INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS.

6. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY: RELATIONS WITH USSR. ON ONE HAND, CHINESE HAD STRESSED THERE IS NO NEW ELEMENT IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH USSR. THIS MEANS CHINA CONTINUES TO DEMAND THAT SOVIETS RESPECT 1969 CHOU-KOSYGIN UNDERSTANDING, I.E. TWO SOVIET COMMITMENTS: (1) TO WITHDRAW SOVIET TROOPS FROM LIMITED DISPUTED AREA NEAR BORDERS, AND (2) TO REDUCE LEVEL OF SOVIET TROOPS IN AREAS NEAR BORDER TO LEVELS OF EARLY 1960'S, AND WITHDRAW ALL

TROOPS FROM MONGOLIA (SINCE THEY ENTERED ONLY AFTER BREZHNEV VISIT AND SIGNATURE OF FRIENDSHIP TREATY IN 1960'S). ON OTHER HAND, IF SOVIETS DO NOT RESPECT THESE COMMITMENTS, IT WILL NOT BE POSSIBLE TO DISCUSS APPLICATION OF PRINCIPLES OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE IN THEIR RELATIONS. CHINESE SAID SOVIETS CONTINUE SUBVERSION AND ESPIONAGE IN CHINA, WITH VIEW TO BRINGING CHINA BACK UNDER SOVIET "BATON" (IN SENSE OF ORCHESTRA CONDUCTOR'S).

7. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY: RELATIONS WITH U.S. ANDREI SAID CHINESE "SHOWED" ROMANIANS THAT CONFRONTATION BETWEEN US AND USSR CONTINUES. BUT, AS MAO TOLD NIXON, US IS TRYING TO DEFEND POSITIONS IT HAD CONQUERED, AND IS ON DEFENSIVE, WHILE SOVIET UNION IS TRYING TO WIN NEW
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POSITIONS. ITS AMBITIONS ARE LARGE; BUT ITS POSSIBILITIES ARE SMALLER (PRESUMABLY COMPARED TO US, THOUGH ANDREI DID NOT SPECIFY), AND IT HAS MANY VULNERABILITIES. CHINA NEEDS PEACE, AND WILL WORK FOR PEACE, BUT THERE IS DANGER OF WAR, ESPECIALLY FROM THE SOVIET UNION. RE US SPECIFICALLY, CHINA HAD EXPRESSED ITS WISH TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS, ON CONDITION TAIWAN PROBLEM IS RESOLVED. CHINESE HAD MADE NO SPECIAL DIRECT CRITICISM OF US, ANDREI SAID; IT HAD BEEN DISCUSSED ONLY IN CONTEXT OF US-SOVIET RIVALRY.

8. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY: DISARMAMENT AND SOVIET MILITARY PRESENCE ABROAD. CHINESE HAD SPOKEN ABOUT DISARMAMENT IN SAME TERMS USED BY HUANG HUA AT UNSSOD, STRESSING IT WOULD BE GOOD IF SOVIET UNION CANCELLED ALL DEBTS LDCS HAD ACCRUED WITH USSR BY BUYING SOVIET WEAPONS. CHINESE HAD EMPHASIZED THAT PEOPLES OF WORLD ARE LEARNING FROM SOVIETS BY NEGATIVE EXAMPLE. THIS HAD HAPPENED IN EGYPT AND IN SUDAN, AND CHINESE THOUGHT IT WOULD ALSO HAPPEN IN ETHIOPIA. CHINESE SAID THAT IN GENERAL WHEREVER THERE ARE SOVIET TROOPS, THERE IS MORE THAN ENOUGH FOOD FOR LEARNING BY NEGATIVE EXAMPLE.

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9. CHINA'S FOREIGN POLICY: RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM. CHINESE SAID THEY HAD HELPED VIETNAMESE A LOT, AND VIETNAMESE CONTINUE TO ASK FOR HELP. HOWEVER, RIGHT AFTER FALL OF SAIGON VIETNAMESE HAD OCCUPIED SPRATLYS, WHICH THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY RECOGNIZED AS CHINESE IN BILATERAL DOCUMENTS. THEY HAVE BEEN PUBLISHING ANTI-CHINESE ARTICLES, AND MADE TROUBLE ON BORDER. RECENTLY, THEY BEGAN TO FORCE CHINESE IN BOTH NORTH AND SOUTH TO ACCEPT VIETNAMESE CITIZENSHIP, AND EXPELLED THOSE WHO REFUSED BY FORCE, DESPITE PREVIOUS AGREEMENT THAT ISSUES ARISING FROM PRESENCE OF CHINESE IN VIETNAM WOULD BE RESOLVED BY TWO COUNTRIES THROUGH CONSULTATIONS. HOWEVER, CHINESE HAD AGREED WITH CEAUSESCU'S POSITION THAT DISAGREEMENTS SHOULD BE RESOLVED THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS, IN ORDER TO ACHIEVE RELATIONS OF FRIENDSHIP AND GOOD NEIGHBORLINESS. AT SAME TIME, BECAUSE THEY MUST NOW TAKE CARE OF EXPELLEES, CHINESE HAD INFORMED VIETNAMESE THEY WILL BE UNABLE TO PROCEED ON "SOME TENS" OF ECONOMIC PROJECTS THEY HAD EARLIER AGREED TO FURNISH.

10. ROMANIAN-CHINESE DIFFERENCES. THEY HAD BEEN MANY DIFFERENCES OF VIEW BETWEEN CHINESE AND ROMANIANS, ANDREI SAID. "THREE WORLDS" THEORY WAS ONE; ROMANIANS HAVE ANOTHER THEORY AND PRACTICE. ON SOVIET UNION, ROMANIANS TOLD CHINESE THEY ALSO HAVE PROBLEMS, TO CONFIDENTIAL

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MENTION ONLY INTEGRATION, IN POLITICAL, ECONOMIC OR IDEOLOGICAL SPHERES. ROMANIANS DO NOT AGREE TO INTEGRATION, SINCE THEY BELIEVE THAT FOR A LONG TIME TO COME RELATIONS BETWEEN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES MUST BE BASED ON INDEPENDENCE AND SOVEREIGNTY, AND TIME HAS NOT ARRIVED FOR EXPANSION OF SOVIET MULTINATIONAL STATE. BUT THEY ALSO BELIEVE DIFFERENCES SHOULD BE DISCUSSED PEACEFULLY, WITHOUT PUBLIC ATTACKS. THEY THEREFORE AGREE NEITHER WITH CHINA NOR SOVIET UNION. HUA HAD REPLIED CHINA WANTS TO IMPROVE RELATIONS WITH USSR, BUT SOVIETS MUST FIRST GIVE PROOFS OF HONEST INTENTIONS. CHINA UNDERSTANDS ROMANIAN POSITION,

BUT DOES NOT WISH ROMANIA TO DEVELOP SAME TYPE OF RELATIONS WITH USSR THAT CHINA HAS.

11. HUA VISIT TO TOMANIA. HUA WILL COME TO TOMANIA IN MID-AUGUST 1978, ANDREI SAID. TWO SIDES HAD STRESSED THAT TALKS WERE A SUCCESS, AND WERE IN SPIRIT OF GUIDELINES SET FORTH BY MAO AND CHOU EN-LAI WHILE THEY WERE ALIVE, TO DEVELOP RELATIONS WITH ROMANIA. THERE HAD BEEN NO DECLARATION BECAUSE CHINESE TOLD THEM THEY HAD DECIDED NOT TO SIGN POLITICAL DOCUMENTS WITH ANYONE FROM NOW ON. BUT IN SPIRIT OF GOOD RELATIONS, AND ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND SEVERAL TRADE AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN SIGNED. THERE WAS NO QUESTION OF CREDITS.

12. KOREA: ECONOMIC SITUATION. ROMANIANS FOUND THAT DPRK HAD REGISTERED IMPORTANT SUCCESSES IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT, DESPITE DROUGHT AND ECONOMIC DIFFICULTIES WITH BOTH USSR AND PRC. ALL ITS OIL CAME FROM USSR. COKING COAL CAME FROM CHINA, AND PRINCIPAL CHINESE COKING COAL MINE HAD BEEN SEVERELY HIT IN 1976 EARTHQUAKE. DROUGHT HAD CAUSED PROBLEMS WITH ELECTRIC POWER, SINCE MOST COMES FROM HYDROELECTRIC INSTALLATIONS. KOREANS
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HAVE WORKED OUT A 7 YEAR PLAN CALLING FOR 1984 PRODUCTION OF 7.5 MILLION TONS OF STEEL, 12 MILLION OF CEMENT AND 10 MILLION OF RICE; IN 1977 RICE PRODUCTION WAS 8.5 MILLION TONS. KOREANS ARE WORKING VERY HARD, WITH PYONGYANG A MODERN CITY AND VILLAGES RECONSTRUCTED ON HILLS, TO LEAVE VALLEYS CLEAR FOR AGRICULTURE. THEY WISH TO DEVELOP FISHING AND TO RAISE LAST YEAR'S 1.5 MILLION TONS OF FISH AND SEAFOOD PRODUCTS TO 3.5 MILLION BY 1984. IN 7 YEAR PLAN THEY ALSO WISH TO BUILD 100 SHIPS OF OVER 12,000 TONS, AND BUILD MORE THERMOPOWER STATIONS. FINALLY, THEY WISH TO DIVERSIFY THEIR TRADE, AND MOVE FROM CURRENT 70 PERCENT WITH USSR AND PRC TO 25 PERCENT WITH SOVIETS AND 20 PERCENT WITH CHINESE.

13. KOREA: POLITICAL TALKS: QUALIFIED TRILATERALISM. IN POLITICAL TALKS, ANDREI SAID, MAIN ISSUE FOR KOREANS HAD BEEN REUNIFICATION. THEY MADE CLEAR THEY WISHED TO RESOLVE IT BY PEACEFUL MEANS, AND WISHED TO DISCUSS IT WITH US. ON QUESTION OF DISCUSSIONS WITH ROK, THEY DECLARED THERE IS NO OBSTACLE PROVIDED THERE IS A DEMOCRATIC REGIME IN THE SOUTH. ANDREI SAID HE ALSO WISHED TO INFORM ME THAT KOREANS HAD SAID THERE COULD BE MEETING WITH REGIME IN SOUTH EVEN BEFORE RPT BEFORE CHANGE OF REGIME, PROVIDED ONLY THERE WERE SOME RPT SOME DEMOCRATIZATION, SUCH AS LIBERATION OF POLITICAL PRISONERS AND LEGALIZATION OF POLITICAL PARTIES. THIS COULD

CREATE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR TALKS, SINCE IT WOULD
OBVIATE CRITICISM OF SUCH TALKS BY BANNED SOUTH KOREAN
POLITICAL PARTIES. HE WISHED TO EMPHASIZE, ANDREI
CONCLUDED, THAT KOREANS BELIEVE THAT IN SUCH SITUATION
THERE WOULD BE FAVORABLE CONDITIONS FOR TRILATERAL TALKS.

14. VIETNAM: ECONOMIC SITUATION. ROMANIANS HAD FOUND
ECONOMIC CONDITIONS IN VIETNAM HARD, WITH 10 MILLION
UNEMPLOYED AND FACTORIES IDLE FOR LACK OF RAW MATERIALS
THEY NEEDED FROM OUTSIDE. THERE HAD BEEN TROUBLE WITH
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THE TWO CURRENCIES AND WITH DIFFERENT SOCIAL STRUCTURES
IN NORTH AND SOUTH. NEVERTHELESS, VIETNAMESE TOLD THEM
POPULATION IS ENTHUSIASTIC, THEY NUMBER 50 MILLION AND
HAVE FERTILE LAND AND RICH SEAS AND FORESTS, SO THEY ARE
CONFIDENT ABOUT FUTURE.

15. VIETNAM: RELATIONS WITH US. VIETNAMESE HAD TOLD
ROMANIANS THEY WANT TO REACH NORMALIZATION WITH US, BUT
MUST INSIST US RESPECT COMMITMENTS TO CONTRIBUTE TO
REBUILDING OF COUNTRY, NOT AS WAR REPARATIONS, BUT IN FORM
ACCEPTABLE TO US. THEY WANTED A PACKAGE DEAL, CONSISTING
OF (1) REESTABLISHMENT (SIC) OF RELATIONS, (2) INFORMATION
ON WAR DEAD AND MISSING IN ACTION, AND (3) US CONTRIBUTION
TO REBUILDING. THEY WERE ALSO CONSIDERING PART US FIRMS
COULD PLAY IN CERTAIN PROJECTS. WHEN CEAUSESCU HAD
RAISED POSSIBILITY OF JOINT COOPERATION WITH ROMANIAN
AND US FIRMS, THEY HAD NOT REJECTED IT.

16. VIETNAM: RELATIONS WITH CHINA. VIETNAMESE HAD
EXPLAINED THAT BECAUSE OF VIETNAM-KAMPUCHEA DISPUTE THERE
WERE SERIES OF PROBLEMS IN THEIR RELATIONS WITH CHINA.
AMONG CHINESE IN VIETNAM, RUMORS HAD SPREAD THAT THERE
WOULD BE WAR BETWEEN VIETNAM AND CHINA, AND THIS WAS
WHY SOME HAD FLED TO CHINA. WHEN ROMANIANS EXPLAINED
THEIR POSITION TO VIETNAMESE (AS THEY HAD PREVIOUSLY TO

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CHINESE)--THAT PROBLEMS SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY POLITICAL MEANS -- VIETNAMESE HAD REPLIED THAT KAMPUCHEA HAD ADOPTED POSITION IT HAD BECAUSE OF CHINESE BACKING, AND WOULD NOT HAVE HAD "COURAGE" TO DO SO OTHERWISE.

17. VIETNAM: RELATIONS WITH KAMPUCHEA. VIETNAMESE HAD SAID THEIR POSITION WAS AS STATED IN PUBLIC PROPOSALS. IT IS NOT TRUE THEY WANT AN INDOCHINESE FEDERATION; THEY KNOW THERE ARE THREE COUNTRIES. RE KAMPUCHEAN ACCUSATION THAT VIETNAM WISHES TO OVERTHROW KAMPUCHEAN LEADERSHIP AND REPLACE IT WITH PRO-VIETNAMESE ONE, VIETNAMESE SAID LEADERSHIP IS INTERNAL AFFAIR OF KAMPUCHEA. THEY RECOGNIZE THAT PARROT'S BEAK IS KAMPUCHEAN, AND HAVE NO TERRITORIAL CLAIMS ON KAMPUCHEA. ANDREI SAID ROMANIANS HAD EXPLAINED THEIR POSITION, WHICH IS THAT PROBLEMS SHOULD BE RESOLVED BY POLITICAL MEANS, WITH WITHDRAWAL OF TROOPS TO INTERNATIONAL BOUNDARIES, RESPECT FOR SOVEREIGNTY AND INDEPENDENCE, AND NON-INTERFERENCE IN INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF OTHERS.

18. LAOS. LAOS IS COUNTRY WITHOUT INDUSTRY OR ACCESS TO SEA, LITTLE INTERNAL TRANSPORT AND SERIES OF POLITICAL PROBLEMS. CERTAINLY VIETNAMESE AND SOVIET INFLUENCE IS VERY STRONG, ROMANIANS HAD FOUND, ESPECIALLY FROM CONFIDENTIAL

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VIETNAMESE ADVISORS, INCLUDING ADVISORS IN ARMY. THERE HAD BEEN UNDERSTANDING BETWEEN TWO SIDES RE POLITICAL PROBLEMS. RE ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, HOWEVER, LAO HAD WANTED AID AND 20-YEAR CREDITS AT 1 OR 2 PERCENT, AND ROMANIANS HAD TOLD THEM THEY COULD NOT GRANT SUCH AID, AND HAD NEVER HAD IT THEMSELVES. US HAD GRANTED 1.5 BILLION DOLLARS IN AID TO LAOS OVER EXTENDED PERIOD, BECAUSE IT WOULD AFFORD IT ("INTER ALIA," ANDREI ADDED), BUT ROMANIA COULD NOT.

19. KAMPUCHEA: ECONOMIC SITUATION. ROMANIANS HAD FOUND KAMPUCHEANS CONCENTRATING ON TASK OF FEEDING

PEOPLE. IN 1976 THEY HAD SUCCEEDED IN SUPPLYING INTERNAL NEEDS AND EXPORTING RICE TOO; 1977 HARVEST HAD BEEN BETTER; AND 1978 SHOULD BE EVEN BETTER. ALL PEOPLE HAD BEEN SENT FROM CITIES TO WORK IN FIELDS; SOME WOULD BE BROUGHT BACK AS PLANTS AND EVEN SERVICES WERE ESTABLISHED, BUT PRIORITY WOULD CONTINUE TO BE ON FOOD. KAMPUCHEANS HAD ASKED ROMANIANS FOR NEITHER AID NOR CREDITS; ECONOMIC AGREEMENTS HAD BEEN PURELY ON BASIS OF MUTUAL ADVANTAGE.

20. KAMPUCHEA: RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM. KAMPUCHEANS HAD BEEN TRASFIXED BY RELATIONS WITH VIETNAM. THEY SAID VIETNAMESE HAD NOT RETREATED FROM PARROT'S BEAK, HAD TAKEN SOME ISLANDS BELONGING TO KAMPUCHEA AND WISHED TO OCCUPY OTHERS. THEY BELIEVED VIETNAMESE CONTINUE TO WANT INDOCHINESE FEDERATION, OR AT LEAST "SPECIAL RELATIONS" WITH KAMPUCHEA LIKE THOSE THEY HAD WITH LAOS: THEY NOTED "VIETNAMESE COMRADES" HAD "ACCEPTED" HO CHI MINH TRAIL FROM LAO. THEY HAD HAD MANY TALKS WITH VIETNAMESE COMRADES, KAMPUCHEANS SAID, BUT VIETNAMESE HAD NEVER RESPECTED PLEDGES, AND ALWAYS WISHED TO NEGOTIATE FROM POSITIONS OF SUPERIORITY AND PRESSURE, WITH THEIR BIG

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ARMY. KAMPUCHEA HAD PROPOSED CESSATION OF BORDER HOSTILITIES FOR CERTAIN PERIOD AND THEN NEGOTIATIONS TO RESOLVE PROBLEMS, BUT THEY COULD NOT NEGOTIATE WHILE HOSTILITIES CONTINUE AND LARGE ARMIES SIT ON BORDER. WHEN ROMANIANS HAD EXPLAINED POSITION ABOUT RESOLUTION THROUGH POLITICAL MEANS, KAMPUCHEANS HAD REPLIED THEY EXPECT CONCRETE ACTIONS FROM VIETNAMESE. THEY TOO WISH POLITICAL SOLUTION, BUT FIRST VIETNAM SHOULD CEASE AGGRESSION AND MILITARY ACTS. THEY WERE CONVINCED VIETNAMESE HAD NOT GIVEN UP WISH TO "SWALLOW" KAMPUCHEA.

21. KAMPUCHEA: RELATIONS WITH US AND CHINA. KAMPUCHEANS HAD TOLD ROMANIANS THEY WANT AND WILL BE SATISFIED WITH NON-ALIGNED STATUS. THEY HAD BEEN NO CRITICISM OF US AT ALL. ONCE THEY HAD RESOLVED DOMESTIC PROBLEMS, THEY SAID, THEY WISHED TO EXPAND DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH MANY COUNTRIES BUT THEY WERE CLEARLY PREOCCUPIED WITH DOMESTIC DIFFICULTIES. US WAS NOT MENTIONED EVEN IN DISCUSSIONS OF WAR. IT WAS ALSO CLEAR, HOWEVER, THAT RELATIONS WITH CHINESE COMRADES ARE GOOD, AND CHINESE ARE GIVING AID.

22. KAMPUCHEA: POLITICAL BACKGROUND OF DISPUTE WITH VIETNAM. IN RESPONSE TO MY QUESTION AS TO WHETHER ROMANIANS HAD SEEN EVIDENCE OF MASS KILLING FOR POLITICAL OR OTHER PURPOSES, ANDREI SAID ROMANIANS HAD NOT STAYED LONG, AND PHNOM PENH WAS "AN EMPTY CITY,"

WITH PERHAPS 20,000 PEOPLE: WHAT COULD HE SAY?
KAMPUCHEANS HAD HOWEVER SAID THERE HAD BEEN A GROUP IN
THE PARTY TIED TO VIETNAM, WHICH HAD BEEN ATTEMPTED
COUP D'ETAT. SINCE 1970 KAMPUCHEANS WHO HAD TIES TO
VIETNAM, USUALLY BECAUSE THEY WERE MARRIED TO VIETNAMESE
OR HAD STUDIED IN VIETNAM, HAD BEEN SENT INTO KAMPUCHEA,
WHERE THEY HAD FORMED A PARTY PARALLEL TO THE OFFICIAL
ONE ALSO CREATED BY VIETNAMESE. TASK OF OFFICIAL PARTY
IN 1975 HAD BEEN TO LIBERATE PHNOM PENH BEFORE SAIGON
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FELL, TO PREVENT VIETNAMESE FROM LIBERATING IT AND
CLAIMING TO HAVE DONE EVERYTHING IN KAMPUCHEA. THEY HAD
ALSO HAD PROBLEMS WITH LON NOL GROUP, ESPECIALLY WITH
MA TAK WHO HAD STAYED IN COUNTRY.

23. CONCLUSION. ANDREI, WHO HAD BRIEFED ME DRAWING ON
EXTENSIVE TYPEWRITTEN NOTES EVIDENTLY CONSTITUTING FULL
TRIP REPORT, ASKED THAT ACCOUNT BE HELD IN FULL CONFIDENCE
AND NOT DISCUSSED WITH OTHER BUCHAREST DIPLOMATS. AS I
LEFT, HE NOTED WITH A SMILE THAT SOVIET AMBASSADOR WOULD
FOLLOW ME. I DID NOT ASK WHETHER HE WOULD RECEIVE SAME
BRIEFING, BUT I DOUBT IT.

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